Federal Criminal Procedure-Transfer for Trial Under Rule 21(b) by Trickey, F. David
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 8 
1964 
Federal Criminal Procedure-Transfer for Trial Under Rule 21(b) 
F. David Trickey 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons 
Recommended Citation 
F. D. Trickey, Federal Criminal Procedure-Transfer for Trial Under Rule 21(b), 62 MICH. L. REV. 1466 (1964). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss8/14 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1466 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol 62 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-TRANSFER FOR TRIAL UNDER 
RuLE 2I(b)-Defendant, a Delaware corporation, was indicted in the 
Eastern District of Illinois for violations of the Sherman Act.1 Proceeding 
under Rule 2I(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 defendant 
moved to transfer the trial to the District of Minnesota, where its principal 
business offices were located. The parties stipulated that the alleged offenses 
occurred in both Illinois and Minnesota and submitted affidavits, briefs, 
and oral argument on the transfer motion to petitioner, the district court 
judge. While evaluating numerous other factors relevant to the transfer 
motion, the district court gave some weight to the contention of govern-
ment counsel that impartial jurors would be more difficult to obtain in 
Minnesota than in Illinois. The district court denied the motion to trans-
fer. Arguing that the district court's consideration of jury bias in the 
transferee district was improper, the defendant sought a writ of mandamus 
to compel the transfer. The court of appeals granted the writ and ordered 
transfer.8 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed 
and remanded to the district court for redetermination of the transfer 
motion without reference to possible jury bias in the transferee district. 
Appellate supervision by writ of mandamus does not permit a circuit court 
to order transfer on the basis of its own findings after review discloses that 
one of the factors which led the district court to deny transfer under Rule 
2l(b) should not have been considered. Platt v. Minnesota Mining b Mfg. 
Co., 84 Sup. Ct. 769 (1964). 
The Constitution guarantees federal criminal defendants a trial in the 
state where the crime was committed4 before a jury drawn from the district 
and state where the offense was committed.5 Thus prosecution for a federal 
offense committed in a single district can be initiated only in that district. 
Prosecution for a multiple-district federal offense, however, may be brought 
in any one of the districts where the crime was committed.6 A multiple-
district offense-a single crime committed in more than one district-is 
frequently involved in a violation of federal antitrust or criminal con-
1 Sections 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1958). 
2 "The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him 
to another district or division, if it appears from the indictment or information or from 
a bill of particulars that the offense was committed in more than one district or division 
and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be trans• 
£erred to another district or division in which the commission of the offense is charged.'' 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 2l(b) [hereinafter cited as Rule 2l(b)]. 
8 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1963), 63 COLUM. L. REv. 
1324 (1963), rev'd by principal case. 
4 U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2. 
Ii U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
6 Unless constitutional venue rights are waived, a defendant who commits offense A 
in district X and offense B in district Y must be tried in X for offense A and in Y for 
offense B if he is to be tried for both offenses. A multiple-district offense, however, is a 
single offense committed in both district X and district Y, and trial of the defendant in 
either district X or district Y satisfies constitutional venue requirements. 
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spiracy laws.7 Because there was no general provision for transfer of federal 
criminal proceedings prior to the adoption of Rule 2l(b),8 the Govern~ 
ment's choice of the district in which to prosecute for a multiple-district 
offense was final and could not be changed by the defendant or the court.9 
Defendants charged with multiple-district offenses frequently faced trial in 
a district chosen without regard to their convenience or expense.10 The 
hardship to defendants, sometimes caused by abusive governmental forum 
shopping, led to the promulgation of Rule 21(b) in 1946;11 this provision 
gives district judges the power to transfer a criminal proceeding, upon 
defendant's motion, to another district or division in which the offense was 
committed if transfer would be in the "interest of justice."12 
The phrase "interest of justice" implies a broad discretionary power; 
thus, numerous authorities state that the propriety of a Rule 2l(b) transfer 
is a matter for the district court's discretion,18 and a denial of such a 
transfer motion cannot be overturned without proof that the district court 
clearly abused that discretion.14 In practice, district courts give substance to 
the abstract standard, "interest of justice," by balancing factors which 
7 A corporation may be prosecuted for antitrust violations "not only in the judicial 
district whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may be found 
or transacts business •••• " Clayton Act § 12, 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1958). 
Venue for conspiracy lies in the district where the agreement was made or in any district 
where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed. Hyde v. United States, 
225 U.S. 347 (1912); Barber, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A Plea for Return to 
Principle, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 39, 42-43 (1963). See generally PROCEEDINGS, N.Y.U. INSTITUTE 
ON Fm. R. CRIM. P. 169-70, 274-75 (1946) (comments of Youngquist and Medalie, JJ.); 
Freed, The Rules of Criminal Procedure: An Appraisal Based on a Year's Experience, 33 
A.B.A.J. 1010, 1012 (1947). 
8 See U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., NOTES TO THE RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE FOR DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED.STATES 21 (1945); Dession, The New Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure: 11, 56 YALE L.J. 197,224 (1947); Orfield, Transfer of Federal 
Offenses Committed in More than One District or Division, 51 MICH. L. REv. 31, 35 (1952). 
In the case of a few crimes, statutes did provide for transfer for trial. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3239 
(1958). 
9 Gates v. United States, 122 F.2d 571, 577 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 698 
(1942); U.S. ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., op. cit. supra note 8, at 21; Orfield, 
Early Federal Criminal Procedure, 7 WAYNE L. REv. 503, 517-18 (1961). 
10 United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 548 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v. National 
City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 396-97 (S.D. Cal. 1947); PROCEEDINGS, N.Y.U. INSTITUTE ON 
Fm. R. CRIM. P. 274-75 (1946); Dession, supra note 8, at 224-25; Freed, supra note 7, at 
1012. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Rule 2l(b). Proposed changes to Rule 2l(b) would clarify the disposition to be 
made of transfer motions when less than all of the counts charge offenses in the transferee 
district. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments, Rules of Criminal 
Procedure for the United States District Courts, 31 F.R.D. 665, 680-81 (1962). 
18 E.g., Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 
837 (1948); Kott v. United States, 163 F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 
837 (1948); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 
1964); United States v. Rossiter, 25 F.R.D. 258, 260 (D.P.R. 1960); U.S. ADVISORY COMM. 
ON RULES OF CRIM. PROC., op. cit. supra note 8, at 21. 
H E.g., United States v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1960); Shurin v. United 
States, supra note 13, at 570; Kott v. United States, supra note 13, at 987. 
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support and oppose the requested transfer.111 Practical considerations of 
fairness, expediency, and convenience underlie the most frequently cited 
factors, which include the location of a corporate defendant's principal 
place of business;16 the place where substantial elements of the alleged 
offense occurred;17 the location of relevant documents and records; 18 the 
residence and convenience of witnesses likely to be called;19 the amount of 
increased expense to the parties;20 the possible disruption of defendant's 
business;21 the location of counsel;22 docket conditions and opportunity for 
speedy trial in the districts involved;23 and the timeliness of the transfer 
motion.24 No authority, however, prescribes an exclusive list of factors beyond 
which a court may not inquire when deciding a Rule 2l(b) transfer motion. 
Further, the district court's broad discretionary power implies the absence of 
hard and fast rules that exclude certain factors from the determination 
whether transfer is in the "interest of justice."211 Nonetheless, district court 
dispositions of transfer motions are subject to some degree of supervision by 
appellate courts. 
Whether mandamus is properly used to review the denial of transfer 
motions is a somewhat unsettled question.26 Avoiding discussion of the 
mandamus issue, the Supreme Court assumed, purely arguendo, that the 
writ would lie in the principal case to compel district court reconsideration 
15 See, e.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 154-57 
(S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 397-98 (S.D. Cal. 
1947); United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D. Neb. 1951). 
16 E.g., United States v. National City Lines, Inc., supra note 15, at 402; see United 
States v. West Coast News Co., 30 F.R.D. 13, 24 (W .D. Mich. 1962); United States v. General 
Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
17 E.g., United States v. Aronson, 319 F.2d 48, 52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 920 
(1963); United States v. United States Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); 
United States v. Van Allen, 28 F.R.D. 329, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
18 E.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); 
United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v. Erie Basin, 
Metal Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Md. 1948). 
10 E.g., United States v. Foster, 33 F.R.D. 506, 509-10 (D. Md. 1963); United States 
v. General Motors Corp., supra note 18, at 756; United States v. Olen, 183 F. Supp. 212, 
219 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
20 E.g., United States v. Olen, supra note 19, at 219; see United States v. United States 
Steel Corp., 226 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). 
21 E.g., United States v. United States Steel Corp., supra note 20, at 155; United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 194 F. Supp. 754, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); United States v. Olen, 183 
F. Supp. 212, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). 
22 E.g., United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 551 (D. Neb. 1951); United States v. 
National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 398, 402 (S.D. Cal. 1947). 
23 E.g., United States v. Warring, 121 F. Supp. 546, 551 (D. Md. 1954); sec United 
States v. Erie Basin Metal Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 880, 885 (D. Md. 1948). 
24 Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566, 570 (4th Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 837 
(1948); United States v. Foster, 33 F.R.D. 506, 509 (D. Md. 1963) (lateness of motion 
indicated intent to delay proceedings). 
25 United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 7 F.R.D. 393, 397 (S.D. Cal. 1947); cf. 
United States v. White, 95 F. Supp. 544, 550 (D. Neb. 1951). 
26 Compare United States v. Foster, 296 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1961), with United States 
v. Cashin, 281 F.2d 669, 671 (2d Cir. 1960). Sec Note, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1324, 1326-27 
(1963). 
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of the proper factors relevant to the requested transfer; this assumption was 
occasioned by the fact that the Government had not challenged the circuit 
court's position that review by mandamus was proper.27 In addition, the 
Government acquiesced in the circuit court's view that the problem of 
obtaining impartial jurors in the transferee district was an improper 
factor.28 Concluding, however, that the court of appeals had exceeded the 
limits of its supervisory authority, the Supreme Court reversed the order to 
transfer and held that "the District Court's use of an inappropriate factor 
did not empower the Court of Appeals to order the transfer."29 Rather, 
the appropriate criteria should have been selected and left to the district 
court to apply on remand.30 In spite of the saving of judicial energy that 
might result if appellate supervisory authority included the power to order 
transfer after review by mandamus, the Supreme Court's decision in the 
principal case is sound. 
Federal courts have power to issue "all writs necessary or appropriate in 
aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and princi-
ples of law."31 Mandamus has traditionally been used at common law and 
in federal courts to confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its 
prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is 
its duty to act.32 Use of the writ to usurp the discretionary functions of a 
lower court, however, is improper.33 An appellate court transfer order after 
review by mandamus would deprive the lower court of the discretionary 
authority to order transfer which Rule 2l(b) vests in district courts. 
Furthermore, the district courts are in the better position to balance the 
factors relevant to transfer because they initially receive briefs and affi-
davits and hear oral argument on the transfer motion. Although review of 
the record below may justify an appellate court's finding that denial of 
transfer was influenced by an improper factor, the district court still has 
the most complete and direct knowledge of the factors affecting the 
requested transfer. Thus the district court is still in a better position than 
an appellate court to rebalance the opposing interests other than the 
improper factor and to decide whether transfer should be granted. 
The circuit court decision in the principal case strikingly illustrates 
27 Principal case at 772. 
28 Ibid. Arguably, the Supreme Court should have distinguished between the improper 
consideration that an impartial jury could not be selected in Minnesota anq the seemingly 
proper consideration that, in obtaining an impartial jury in Minnesota, the Government 
would have to spend more time preparing for and conducting examination of prospective 
jurors. Although only a minor factor, the increased burden imposed on the Government 
might in some instances be relevant in the balancing process which determines whether 
transfer would be in the "interest of justice." 
20 Principal case at 772. 
ao Ibid. 
31 28 U.S.C. § 165l(a) (1958). 
32 Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 
!118 U.S. 578, 583 (1943); United States v. Hester, 325 F.2d 654, 657 (8th Cir. 1963). 
33 See Bankers Life&: Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 
F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1955). 
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both the difficulty of ordering transfer on the basis of a lower court record 
and the confusion that appellate court transfer orders may generate. After 
determining that an improper factor had been considered,34 the court of 
appeals found that the lower court had placed primary emphasis on the 
improper factor35 and that essential elements of convenience favored 
transfer.36 The court further found transfer consistent with the "funda-
mental historical right of a defendant to be prosecuted in its own environ-
ment or district . . • ."37 Since, however, the district judge had also 
considered nine other admittedly appropriate factors before denying the 
transfer motion,38 he alone knew what weight had been given to the 
improper factor. Thus, the Supreme Court observed, upon remand the 
district judge would know how to redetermine the weight of factors 
relevant to transfer.39 Furthermore, the circuit court's findings with respect 
to the essential elements of convenience flatly contradicted and took no 
account of the district court's findings.40 And the view that criminal 
defendants have the historical or constitutional right to trial in their home 
district is not only erroneous,41 but also obscures the criteria relevant to 
the decision of Rule 2l(b) transfer motions. The court of appeals' language 
suggests that, in addition to considering the numerous practical factors 
which themselves involve fairness, expediency, and convenience, district 
courts must also accord some prior and independent significance to the 
fact the defendant seeks transfer to his home district. Giving independent 
significance to the fact that defendant seeks transfer to his home district 
would disrupt the balancing process which district courts have previously 
employed to take into account with fairness the practical factors relevant 
to the determination whether a requested transfer under Rule 21(b) would 
be in the "interest of justice."42 Finally, it would be unreasonable to 
assume that a member of the federal judiciary would refuse to give fair 
consideration to the relevant factors upon remand. In the unlikely event 
that a district court did refuse to reconsider the decision, or again appraised 
34 Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Platt, 314 F.2d 369, 373-75 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'd, 
principal case. 
35 Id. at 371 n.1. The court of appeals reasoned, unpersuasively, that, because the 
improper factor appeared last on the trial court's memorandum of ten factors relevant to 
transfer, "we are convinced that he saved the most important item for last." Ibid. 
36 Id. at 375 &: n.3. 
37 Id. at 375. 
38 Principal case at 771-72. 
39 Id. at 772. 
40 Id. at 771. 
41 Id. at 772; see notes 4-12 supra and accompanying text. The location of a defendant's 
home district may be relevant when construing venue statutes to determine where 
prosecution for a crime may be initiated. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 27!1, 275 
(1944); Barber, supra note 7. But in the principal case no question of venue was involved; 
the alleged offenses had been committed in both Illinois and Minnesota. 
42 "The fact that Minnesota is the main office or 'home' of the respondent has no 
independent significance in determining whether transfer to that district would be 'in the 
interests of justice,' although it may be considered with reference to such factors as the 
convenience of records, officers, personnel and counsel." Principal case at 772. 
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improper factors, an appellate court transfer order upon review by 
mandamus would seem appropriate if the record clearly demonstrated 
that transfer would be in the "interest of justice."43 
F. David TTickey 
43 Cf. Chicago, R.I. Be P.R.R. v. Igoe, 220 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955). 
